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SOCIOECONOMIC BIAS IN THE JUDICIARY
MICHELE BENEDETTO NEITZ*
ABSTRACT
Judges hold a prestigious place in our judicial system, and they earn double the
income of the average American household.
How does the privileged
socioeconomic status of judges affect their decisions on the bench? This Article
examines the ethical implications of what Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Alex Kozinski
recently called the “unselfconscious cultural elitism” of judges.** This elitism can
manifest as implicit socioeconomic bias.
Despite the attention paid to income inequality, implicit bias research and
judicial bias, no other scholar to date has fully examined the ramifications of implicit
socioeconomic bias on the bench. The Article explains that socioeconomic bias may
be more obscure than other forms of bias, but its impact on judicial decision-making
processes can create very real harm for disadvantaged populations. The Article
reviews social science studies confirming that implicit bias can be prevalent even in
people who profess to hold no explicit prejudices. Thus, even those judges who
believe their wealthy backgrounds play no role in their judicial deliberations may be
influenced by implicit socioeconomic bias. The Article verifies the existence of
implicit socioeconomic bias on the part of judges through examination of recent
Fourth Amendment and child custody cases. These cases reveal that judges can and
do favor wealthy litigants over those living in poverty, with significant negative
consequences for low-income people.
The Article contends that the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Code of
Judicial Conduct (the Code), the document designed to regulate the behavior of
judges, fails to effectively eliminate implicit socioeconomic bias. The Article
recommends innovative revisions designed to strengthen the Code’s prohibition
against bias, and suggests improvements to judicial training materials in this context.
These changes will serve to increase judicial awareness of the potential for implicit
socioeconomic bias in their judicial decisions, and will bring this issue to the
forefront of the judicial agenda.
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dissenting).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the early 1970s, Robert William Kras asked the United States Supreme Court
to allow him to proceed in bankruptcy court without paying the requisite filing fees.1
Mr. Kras lived in a small apartment with multiple extended family members and his
younger child was hospitalized with cystic fibrosis.2 Mr. Kras had been unemployed
for several years, after losing his job with a life insurance company when the
premiums he had collected were stolen out of his home.3 His wife had to give up her
employment due to her pregnancy, and she was focused on caring for their ill son.
The family lived on public assistance benefits and had no real assets.4

1

United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 437 (1973).

2

Id.

3

Id.

4

Id. at 438.
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Mr. Kras was indisputably living in poverty. Hoping to improve his prospects
for future employment, Mr. Kras desired a discharge in bankruptcy. However, Mr.
Kras was turned away before he even reached the bankruptcy courtroom because he
could not afford the $50 in filing fees to submit his bankruptcy petition.5
The Supreme Court denied Mr. Kras’s request to waive his filing fees, holding
that the statute requiring payment of fees to access bankruptcy courts did not violate
the United States Constitution. The majority opinion, written by Justice Blackmun,
noted that the filing fees, when paid in weekly $1.92 installments, represented a sum
“less than the price of a movie and little more than the cost of a pack or two of
cigarettes.”6 Justice Blackmun declared that if Mr. Kras “really needs and desires
[bankruptcy], this much available revenue should be within his able-bodied reach.”7
Using disparaging words such as “little more” and “able-bodied,” the Court
presumed that any individual could afford the $50 filing fee.8
In dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall declared the majority of the Court had
demonstrated a fundamental misunderstanding of the lives of poor people.9 Justice
Marshall explained, “It may be easy for some people to think that weekly savings of
less than $2 are no burden. But no one who has had close contact with poor people
can fail to understand how close to the margin of survival many of them are.”10
Despite the majority’s apparent belief that poor people go to the theater on a weekly
basis, Justice Marshall made clear that poor people rarely, if ever, see a movie.11
Instead, the “desperately poor” must choose to use their limited funds for more
important things, including caring for a sick child as Mr. Kras was required to do.12
Justice Marshall rebuked his colleagues for their insensitivity to the plight of poor
people: “[I]t is disgraceful for an interpretation of the Constitution to be premised
upon unfounded assumptions about how [poor] people live.”13
Nearly forty years later, the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit echoed Justice
Marshall with similar observations about the assumptions of his colleagues on the
bench. In United States v. Pineda-Moreno, a Fourth Amendment case upholding the
placement of a Global Positioning System (GPS) device on a defendant’s car parked
outside his modest home, the Ninth Circuit denied the defendant’s petition for a
rehearing en banc on his motion to suppress the GPS evidence.14 Dissenting from
5

Id. This amount represents approximately $250 in 2011 dollars. Deborah L. Rhode,
Thurgood Marshall and His Clerks, in IN CHAMBERS: STORIES OF SUPREME COURT LAW
CLERKS AND THEIR JUSTICES 314, 321 (Todd C. Peppers & Aremus Ward eds., 2012).
6

Kras, 409 U.S. at 449.

7

Id.

8

Karen Gross, In Forma Pauperis in Bankruptcy: Reflecting On and Beyond United
States v. Kras, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 57, 60 (1994).
9

Kras, 409 U.S. at 460 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

10

Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting)

11

Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).

12

Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).

13

Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).

14

United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216-17 (9th Cir. 2010).
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the denial of the petition for rehearing, Chief Judge Kozinski took the analysis one
step beyond the case’s constitutional implications.15 Chief Judge Kozinski deplored
the fact that his fellow Ninth Circuit judges failed to appreciate how their decision,
allowing the placement of the GPS tracking device on the defendant’s car because he
had not shielded it from public view, would impact poor people differently than
wealthy people. Constitutional interpretation should not give preference to wealthy
individuals, yet “when you glide your BMW into your underground garage or behind
an electric gate, you don’t need to worry that somebody might attach a tracking
device to it while you sleep.”16
Why do some judges overlook the impacts of their decisions on poor people?
Chief Judge Kozinski posited that the reason lies in “unselfconscious cultural
elitism.”17 Most likely, the Kras Court and the Pineda-Moreno majority were not
actively attempting to create laws favoring the rich over the poor. But this
consequence is one result of the lack of socioeconomic diversity on the bench.18
Chief Judge Kozinski noticed that “No truly poor people are appointed as federal
judges, or as state judges for that matter. Judges, regardless of race, ethnicity, or sex,
are selected from the class of people who don’t live in trailers or urban ghettos.”19
Accordingly, his colleagues did not appreciate that “the everyday problems of people
who live in poverty are not close to our hearts and minds because that’s not how we
and our friends live.”20
Justice Marshall and Chief Judge Kozinski acknowledged the difference between
judges and most of their litigants: Judges overwhelmingly come from wealthy
backgrounds, and many have never walked in the shoes of economically
disadvantaged people.21 In effect, elite judges may render decisions that negatively
impact poor individuals simply because they do not recognize that they are doing so.

15

Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120. For a full examination of this case, see infra Part III.A.

16

Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1123.

17

Id. (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).

18

Id. (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).

19

Id. (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).

20

Id. (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).

21

Of course, there are some judges who overcame great poverty and other challenges to
achieve their roles on the bench. See, e.g., Bob Egelko, Federal Judge Nominee Troy Nunley
Works His Way Up, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, July 9, 2012, available at
http://www.sfgate.com/default/article/Federal-judge-nominee-Troy-Nunley-works-his-wayup-3692208.php?cmpid=emailarticle&cmpid=emailarticle#photo-3170832 (describing Judge
Troy Nunley’s path from childhood poverty to a judgeship). Judge Nunley, a Sacramento
County Superior Court judge, was nominated by President Obama to the U.S. District Court in
Sacramento on June 25, 2010. But such judges are a rarity, particularly in the prestigious
federal courts. For example, Supreme Court justices disproportionately come from three Ivy
League law schools: Harvard, Yale, and Columbia. SUSAN NAVARRO SMELCER, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R40802, SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS,
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE, AND LEGAL EDUCATION, 1789-2010 (2010). Eight of the nine
current justices attended one of those three law schools. Id. Moreover, as discussed infra Part
II.A., even those judges who came from poverty now earn much higher incomes than average
Americans.
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Opponents seeking to deny Chief Judge Kozinski’s charge of elitism may point
to the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Code of Judicial Conduct (the
Code), the model standard of ethics intended to provide guidance for judicial
behavior.22 The Code specifically prohibits judges from employing bias on the basis
Judicial ethicists might
of socioeconomic status when adjudicating cases.23
therefore argue that Chief Judge Kozinski’s observations about the wealthy positions
of judges are irrelevant to judicial decision-making processes; judges may be
wealthier than some litigants, but the Code forbids judges from being influenced by
socioeconomic bias. Yet the Code’s success in preventing socioeconomic bias is
subject to some debate. For example, did the conduct of the Supreme Court majority
in Kras or the Ninth Circuit panel in Pineda-Moreno rise to the level of bias?
This Article examines the ethical implications of the “unselfconscious cultural
elitism” of judges.24 Because judges are more economically privileged than the
average individual litigant appearing before them, they may be unaware of the gaps
between their own experiences and realities and those of poor people. These gaps
have contributed to patterns of judicial decision-making that appear to be biased
against poor people as compared to others.
Although judges are required to decide cases in a neutral and impartial manner,
every judge may be influenced in some way by his or her personal beliefs. Many
judges, aware of the potential for this influence, actively work to separate their
judicial determinations from their personal opinions. In some cases, however, a
judge’s particular viewpoints may result in biased decision-making processes—
whether or not the judge is aware that such bias exists. Bias is defined as
“inclination; prejudice; predilection,” and judicial bias is “a judge's bias toward one
or more of the parties to a case over which the judge presides.”25 Moreover, judicial
bias may be subtle and implicit.
Part II of this Article begins with consideration of the two manifestations of bias
at issue in this context: Socioeconomic bias and implicit bias. Socioeconomic bias
may be more obscure than other forms of bias, but its impact on judicial decisionmaking processes can create very real harm for disadvantaged populations.
Because socioeconomic bias is subtle, most judges do not explicitly display bias
against poor people. Nonetheless, new scientific research confirms that implicit bias
can be prevalent even in people who profess to hold no explicit prejudices. Thus,
Part II explains that even those judges who believe their wealthy backgrounds play
no role in their judicial deliberations may be influenced by implicit socioeconomic
bias.
Part III verifies the existence of implicit socioeconomic bias on the part of judges
through examination of recent Fourth Amendment and child custody cases. These
cases reveal that judges can and do favor wealthy litigants over those living in
poverty, with significant negative consequences for low-income people.
Part IV assesses the role of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct (the Code)
in the elimination of such bias. The Model Code is designed to ensure fairness and
neutrality on the bench. This section recommends changes designed to strengthen
22

See generally MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2011).

23

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.3(B) (2011).

24

Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1123 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).

25

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 183 (9th ed. 2009).
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the Code’s prohibition against bias, and suggests improvements to judicial training
materials in this context. These changes will serve to increase judicial awareness of
the potential for implicit socioeconomic bias in their judicial deliberations, thus
minimizing the impact of such biases on poor litigants.
II. THE CHALLENGES OF IDENTIFYING IMPLICIT SOCIOECONOMIC BIAS
A. The Economic Status of Judges
Judicial salaries are much higher than those earned by average Americans.
Nearly all state and federal judges in the United States earn a six figure salary. For
example, in 2010, district court judges earned a set salary of $174,000, and circuit
court judges made $184,000.26 Supreme Court justices make over $200,000.27
Depending on the jurisdiction, state court judges may make more or less than federal
judges. For example, state appellate judges earn salaries ranging from $105,050 in
Mississippi (the state with the lowest paid state appellate judges) to $204,599 in
California (the state boasting the highest salaries for its appellate judges). 28 In 2010,
the median household income was $49,445.29 Thus, judges earn more than double
the income of the average American.
Like all people, judges are influenced by their economic backgrounds.30 Since
people are “more favorably disposed to the familiar, and fear or become frustrated
with the unfamiliar,” the wealthy positions of most judges may prevent them from
fully appreciating the challenges faced by poor litigants in their courtrooms.31 Lowincome people “are not just like rich people without money.”32 Workers in lowwage jobs are often teetering on the edge of abject poverty: “They cannot save,
cannot get decent health care, cannot move to better neighborhoods, and cannot send
their children to schools that offer a promise for a successful future.”33
26
Judicial Salaries Since 1968, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer
.aspx?doc=/uscourts/JudgesJudgeships/docs/JudicialSalariescJudi.pdf (last visited Jan. 23,
2013).
27
Id. Notably, federal judges have not received reliable cost of living pay increases in the
last decade, and are paid less than some federal employees in the executive branch and
banking industries. Federal and Judicial Pay Increase Fact Sheet, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/JudicialCompensation/JudicialPayIncreaseFac
t.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 2013).
28

NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS (NCSC), 36(2) SURVEY OF JUDICIAL SALARIES (Jan. 1,
2011). These differences can be attributed to the cost of living discrepancies among various
states.
29
Income Poverty and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2010, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/
income_wealth/cb11-157.html. This amount represented a 2.3% decline from the median in
2009 as a result of the recent recession. Id.
30

Rose Matsui Ochi, Racial Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing, 24 JUDGES J. 6, 53
(1985).
31

Id.

32

Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L. J. 1049, 1049 (19691970).
33

DAVID SHIPLER, THE WORKING POOR: INVISIBLE IN AMERICA 4 (2005).
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Additionally, living in poverty “creates an abrasive interface with society; poor
people are always bumping into sharp legal things.”34 Thus, for poor people,
everyday living requires the “the ability to live with [the] unrelenting challenges and
chronic instability of being poor.”35 Judges, on the other hand, generally have wellpaid and stable employment positions.36 This discrepancy creates an economic
imbalance in courtrooms that may result in socioeconomic bias.
The difference in economic status between judges and litigants has not gone
unnoticed, and the public is increasingly equating wealth with the ability to obtain
fairness in American courts. A recent survey by the National Center for State Courts
found that Californians believe the level of fairness in state courts is least for those
with low incomes and non-English speakers.37 Nationally, 62% of Americans
believe the courts favor the wealthy.38
These statistics reveal the importance of evaluating judicial socioeconomic bias
in American courtrooms. If judges’ decisions are influenced—consciously or
unconsciously—by their elite and privileged status, the public trust in the American
judicial system will continue to be undermined. Conversely, increased judicial
attention to the problem of socioeconomic bias will signal to the public that judges
recognize the importance of justice for all litigants, regardless of economic class.
B. Socioeconomic Bias vs. Class Privilege
The elite status of most judges enables them to enjoy the benefits of class
privilege, meaning that their life experiences are different than those of lowerincome people.39 Some judges may not recognize their privileged positions, since
they “believe that their success is based on their individual merit, gaining the
‘supreme privilege of not seeing themselves as privileged.’”40
34

Wexler, supra note 32, at 1050.

35
Eden E. Torres, Power, Politics, and Pleasure: Class Differences and the Law, 54
RUTGERS L. REV. 853, 863 (2002) (citing Alan Wald, A Pedagogy of Unlearning: Teaching
the Specificity of U.S. Marxism, in PEDAGOGY, CULTURAL STUDIES, AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE
125, 143 (Amitava Kumar ed., 1997)).
36

Federal judges enjoy lifetime tenure. U.S. CONST. art. III § 1. Appointed federal judges
may serve specific terms. 28 U.S.C.A. § 631(a), (e) (West 2012) (District Court judges
appoint magistrate judges to their respective jurisdictions to eight-year terms); cf. CAL. CONST.
art. VI, § 16(d)(2) (When vacancies arise on the California Supreme Court or a court of
appeal, the Governor appoints judges who hold office until the first general election following
their appointment.) By contrast, elected judges may have to run for election to retain their
positions. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 16(c) (California superior court judges are elected to 6-year
terms.)
37
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS (NCSC), TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE CALIFORNIA
COURTS: A SURVEY OF THE PUBLIC AND ATTORNEYS (Dec. 2006), available at http://www.
courts.ca.gov/documents/Calif_Courts_Book_rev6.pdf.
38
Kathleen Hall Jamieson & Michael Hennessy, Public Understanding of and Support for
the Courts: Survey Results, 95 GEO. L.J. 899, 900 (2007).
39

See supra Part II.A.

40
Lucille A. Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal Education: How Law Schools
Reproduce Social Stratification and Class Hierarchy, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1155, 1195 (2008)
(quoting PIERRE BOURDIEU & JEAN-CLAUDE PASSERON, REPRODUCTION IN EDUCATION,
SOCIETY AND CULTURE 163 (1990)).
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Nevertheless, the influence of class privilege may contribute to implicit
assumptions about members of particular socioeconomic groups, resulting in class
bias. For example, class privilege may rise to the level of bias in the case of a judge
who “acquired his judicial predispositions through the sympathies instilled by a
corporation practice and other schools of privilege.”41 This type of judge is
“conscientiously predisposed to favor privileged classes,” and may then “carr[y] that
predisposition into every case by him considered.”42 While it can be difficult to
recognize these predispositions, “the conscientious judge who believes in class
privileges and undemocratic distinctions is . . . more pernicious than the judge who
is occasionally corrupt.”43
Class privilege may also manifest as the presumption that all persons have
similar experiences, exemplified by Justice Blackmun’s assumption in Kras that all
persons could afford the price of a movie.44 Unlike ordinary citizens, judges have a
duty to receive information, fairly assess it, and incorporate it into their judgments
without bias.45 A judge who adjudicates cases based on the implicit assumption that
all persons are situated similarly to that judge is not properly assessing or
investigating the facts of a given case. Treating all parties as though they were
socioeconomically identical rises beyond privilege to the level of bias, precisely
because judges have a duty to consider the unique facts of every case.
C. The Challenge of Identifying Socioeconomic Bias
1. The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct’s Prohibition of Socioeconomic Bias
The American Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct is intended to
provide disciplinary guidance to all full-time judges, as well as “anyone who is
authorized to perform judicial functions,” including a “justice of the peace,
magistrate, court commissioner, special master, referee, or member of the
administrative law judiciary.”46 Although the first Canons of Judicial Ethics
(Canons) were released by the ABA in 1924, the specific prohibition of bias based
on socioeconomic status was not added until 1990. During the 1974 revisions to the
Code of Judicial Conduct, language was proposed that would have prohibited judges
from treating indigent or welfare litigants differently from their nonindigent
counterparts.47 The Committee revising the Code rejected this proposal, believing
that such a specific standard was not required when a judge was already directed to
be “faithful to the law.”48 Since this standard applied regardless of a litigant’s status

41

Theodore Schroeder, Social Justice and the Courts, 22 YALE L. J. 19, 25 (1912).

42

Id.

43

Id.

44

United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 449 (1973).

45

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.2 and R. 2.3 (2011).

46

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT § I(B) (2011).

47

E. WAYNE THODE, THE REPORTER’S NOTES
(1973).
48

Id.

TO THE

CODE

OF

JUDICIAL CONDUCT 51
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as an indigent or otherwise, further elaboration of the standard was deemed “counterproductive.”49
A different view prevailed during the 1990 revisions to the Code, when the
Committee chose to include a list of specific classes of prohibited biases on the
premise “that a specific listing of examples of prohibited bias or prejudice would
provide needed strength to the rule.”50 Thus, by 1990, the rule prohibiting judicial
bias changed from a general guideline concerning a judge’s general obligation to
remain impartial into a specific rule with clear examples of the types of biases
prohibited by the Code.
The most recent version of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, released in
2007, retained the list of examples of bias and added the categories of gender,
ethnicity, marital status, and political affiliation.51 Thus, Rule 2.3 now provides that
judges shall not “manifest bias or prejudice,” including but not limited to biases
based on “race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual
orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, or political affiliation.”52 This
enumerated list is not meant to be exclusive; the language “included but not limited
to” indicates that the list of prohibited biases provides illustrative examples. 53
The inclusion of socioeconomic bias as one of the specific examples of bias in
the 1990 Code and subsequent revisions may certainly be seen as progress, since it
brings judicial attention to the fact that this type of bias exists. However, this
obscure form of bias is not clearly explained, leaving judges uncertain about what is
meant by the phrase “socioeconomic bias.”
The term “socioeconomic” is defined by Webster’s New International Dictionary
as “of, relating to, or involving a combination of social and economic factors.”54
Without any explanation of what these “factors” may be, this vague general
definition is ambiguous. Yet the Code’s drafters failed to define the term
“socioeconomic” in the “Terminology” section of the Code, and it is not defined
anywhere else in the Code.55 The same is true for the term “bias,” which is also not
defined in the Code’s “Terminology” section.56
The failure to define these key terms is problematic in a Code intended to
provide guidance and serve as the basis for disciplinary procedures for judges.
Assuming the Code’s drafters intended to prohibit judicial bias against the poor and
49

Id.

50

LISA L. MILORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 18 (1992).

51

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.3(B) (2011).

52

Id.

53

MILORD, supra note 50, at 18. Judicial bias has been extensively studied in other
contexts. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777,
821 (2011) (empirical study of judicial bias revealed that “[j]udges, it seems, are human. Like
the rest of us, they use heuristics that can produce systematic errors in judgment.”)
54

WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed.1986).

55

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Terminology (2011).

56

A definition of the term “bias” was proposed, but rejected. Am. Bar Ass’n (ABA) Joint
Comm’n to Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Summary of Teleconference
Minutes (Nov. 17, 2003). The Code does list examples of manifestations of bias. MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.3, cmt. 2 (2011).
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disadvantaged economic classes as well as the wealthy and privileged classes, it is
unclear how these groups should be characterized. As a term, “the poor” can include
“all races, colors, ethnicities, regions, and ages of people, although it is heavy on
women and children . . . . in short, those who at some period of time populate the
low end of the income distribution scale in the United States are indescribably varied
and multifaceted.”57 Yet, the Code makes no mention of how the term
“socioeconomic” should be considered in this context. Thus, judges are prohibited
from engaging in a type of bias that is undefined in the Code, raising concerns about
the enforceability of the Code’s prohibition against socioeconomic bias.
2. The Unique Nature of Socioeconomic Bias
Socioeconomic bias is different from other forms of bias. First, this type of bias
is distinctive because American law treats socioeconomic status differently than
other identities. There is no fundamental right to be wealthy or “free of poverty,"58
and the Constitution does not protect socioeconomic rights by assuring all
Americans economic stability.59 Unlike race or gender, poverty is not a
classification deserving strict or intermediate scrutiny, and the federal government
does not ensure full participation in the economic life of the nation. 60 Thus, there is
no constitutional provision requiring judges to stop and carefully deliberate the
impact of their decisions on poor people.61 In addition, the focus of most legal
scholars and activists on race, gender, and other bases for bias has “shifted attention
away from socioeconomic class.”62 For example, judicial ethics scholars have
extensively considered racial and gender bias, but have placed little to no emphasis
on socioeconomic bias in courtrooms.63
In light of our country’s historical
oppression of women and minority populations, this focus makes sense. However,
the growing gap between rich and poor people in the United States demands renewed
attention to the problem of judicial bias against the poor.64
57

Jordan C. Budd, A Fourth Amendment for the Poor Alone: Subconstitutional Status and
the Myth of the Inviolate Home, 85 IND. L.J. 355, 358 (2010) (citing JOHN GILLIOM,
OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE, AND THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 20-21
(2001)).
58

Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Disparate Treatment of Race and Class in
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 111 (2009).
59

Id.

60

Id. at 112-13.

61

Similarly, there is no constitutional or statutory requirement for employers, government
agencies, landlords, etc., to consider socioeconomic status in the same way as race or gender.
62

Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 58, at 124.

63

Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 49 (1994) (“There is little
research on the issue of poverty bias.”).
64

The economic gap between rich and poor persons is rising in the United States. From
1973 to 2008, the top 1% of Americans saw their share of national income more than double,
from 8% to 18%. Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States,
1913-1998, 118(1) Q. J. OF ECON. (Feb. 2003) (updated to include the years 1998-2008). The
2008 financial crisis had a significant effect on the share of total net worth for American
households: In 2010, the wealthiest 1% held 34.5% of the nation’s wealth, while the bottom
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Second, and more problematic, is the fact that class bias is “much more elusive to
define” than other forms of bias.65 Poor populations are disproportionately people of
color, and the “line between poverty and racial bias is very blurred.” 66 Judges rarely
display explicit bias against poor litigants in courtrooms, and statements about
poverty are deemed less inflammatory than racist or sexist comments made by a
judge.67
Moreover, although a person may be born into poverty, the concept of the
“American dream” implies that “unlike race and gender, poverty is not immutable.”68
As a result, many members of society view poor people as responsible for their
socioeconomic status.69 This viewpoint has historical roots in the early American
conception of poor people as lazy or immoral.70 The poor have traditionally been
stereotyped as “welfare queens” whose behavior merits the “reasonable suspicion
and disdain of broader society.”71 Poor persons who apply for welfare benefits may
be viewed as “presumptive liars, cheaters, and thieves.”72
This stereotype has severe implications for the fate of poor people in the United
States: If an individual’s laziness or immorality is responsible for making someone
poor, why should society (and by extension the justice system) not treat poor people
accordingly? The President’s Crime Commission issued a report in 1972
half of American households held only 1% of all American wealth. Dan Froomkin, Half of
American Households Hold 1 Percent of Wealth, HUFFINGTON POST, July 19, 2012.
65

Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 58, at 125 (2009). Other types of biases, such as
gender bias, may be more readily identifiable in the courtroom. For example, a New York
judge’s statement in 1997 that “[E]very woman needs a good pounding now and then” is a
clear manifestation of gender bias. In re Roberts, 689 N.E.2d 911, 913 (N.Y. 1997).
66

Nugent, supra note 63, at 49.

67

Manifestations of bias against the poor may be overlooked or unnoticed. For example,
California Municipal Court Judge Stephen Drew was publicly admonished in 1995 for a
number of improper judicial actions. Among the facts giving rise to Judge Drew’s
admonishment was his failure to appoint counsel for an unemployed defendant, stating that he
was potentially employable. Judge Drew ordered the defendant to apply for work to afford
private counsel. This action demonstrated socioeconomic bias, but it alone did not result in
disciplinary action; it was considered as only one of numerous improprieties committed by
Judge Drew on the bench. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, Judicial Performance
Commission Issues Public Admonishment of Judge Stephen Drew (July 29, 1995) (public
admonishment release for Judge Stephen Drew of the Tulane County Municipal Court,
Dinuba Division), available at http://cjp.ca.gov/res/docs/Public_Admon/Drew_07-96.pdf.
68

Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 58, at 122 (“The American Dream is that, through
hard work, a person can rise from even a seriously disadvantaged background.”).
69

Id. at 125.

70

Jordan C. Budd, A Fourth Amendment for the Poor Alone: Subconstitutional Status and
the Myth of the Inviolate Home, 85 IND. L.J. 355, 407 (2010) (this viewpoint “has animated
public discourse since the European settlement of North America and served to exclude the
poor from equal participation in our civic life for over two centuries.”).
71
Jordan C. Budd, Pledge Your Body for Your Bread: Welfare, Drug Testing, and the
Inferior Fourth Amendment, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 751, 772-73 (2011).
72

Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643,
646 (2009).
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recognizing the dangers of a system in which wealthy judges adjudicate criminal
cases brought against poor litigants:
[M]any defendants are not understood by and seem threatening to the
court and its officers. Even such simple matters as dress, speech, and
manners may be misinterpreted. Most city prosecutors and judges have
middle class backgrounds and a high degree of education. When they are
confronted with a poor, uneducated defendant, they may have difficulty
judging how he fits into his own society of culture. They can easily
mistake a certain manner of dress or speech, [as] alien or repugnant to
them, but ordinary enough in the defendant’s world as an index of moral
worthlessness. They can mistake ignorance or fear of the law as
indifference to it. They can mistake the defendant’s resentment against
social evils with which he lives as evidence of criminality.73
Thus, judges are not immune from the influence of this stereotype.74 In some
cases, the fact that poor people are different than lawyers and judges may serve as
the basis for socioeconomic bias in courtrooms. Judges, lawyers, and other officers
of the court are perceived by themselves as hardworking, and they act in expected
ways. Poor people may act or appear differently, which can be interpreted by judges
as a failure to exhibit some of the admirable qualities of the members of the legal
profession. Because the experiences of poor litigants are unfamiliar to judges,
socioeconomic bias may infect a judge’s own decision-making processes.75
For example, a study commissioned by the Georgia Supreme Court in the mid1990’s concluded that the justice system is biased against the poor.76 According to
an assistant district attorney who participated in the Georgia study, poor people were
more likely to end up in court, notwithstanding their skin color, because “the
problems lie not directly with race but rather with financial and social problems.”77
The study included “attitude surveys” of judicial officers, court clerks, and lawyers.
Survey comments suggested that “[t]he real evil is not racial bias but lack of
empowerment for the poor; [p]oor people of little education are victims of bias;
[t]his is also a class/money problem; i.e.—the better dressed, educated, and wealthier
litigants are treated better by everyone in the court system.”78 As the study noted,
socioeconomic bias in courtrooms affects minority populations more seriously, since
these populations are a “greater portion of the economically and educationally

73
Ochi, supra note 30, at 8 (citing PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT &
ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 50 (1967)).
74

Budd, supra note 71, at 773 (“This conception of the indigent influences judicial
perceptions as well.”).
75

Nugent, supra note 63, at 49.

76

Ga. Supreme Court Comm’n on Racial & Ethnic Bias in the Court Sys., Let Justice be
Done: Equally, Fairly, and Impartially, 42 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 687, 700 (1996).
77

Id.

78

Id.
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disadvantaged.”79 To compound the problem, persons living in poverty are
increasingly marginalized and alienated from other members of society.80
Thus, those seeking to quantify socioeconomic bias on the part of judges face a
daunting challenge: The elusive nature of socioeconomic bias, and the fact that it is
often obscured by racial or gender bias, make it difficult bias to recognize. In fact,
the more insidious form of socioeconomic bias is likely to be implicit—an
unconscious bias against the poor on the part of the judges.81
Of course, many judges are sympathetic to the plight of the economically
disadvantaged, and actively work to be aware of their own personal biases.82 As
discussed in Part II.C infra, this awareness may work to reduce the prevalence of
biases against poor litigants in courtrooms.83 However, not all biases are overtly
recognized and consciously reduced; unconscious beliefs about poor people may
play a larger role in judicial decision-making than has been previously
acknowledged.
3. The Challenge of Identifying Implicit Bias
Any type of bias can be explicit or implicit. The term “explicit bias” is used to
indicate that a person recognizes his or her bias against a particular group, believes
that bias to be appropriate, and acts on it.84 This is the type of bias that “people
knowingly—and sometimes openly—embrace.” 85
Explicit bias on the basis of race or ethnicity has declined significantly over time,
and is now mostly viewed as “unacceptable” in society.86 As discussed above,
judges are prohibited by the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct from displaying
such bias on the bench.87
Implicit bias is a more subtle form of bias. It is unintentional,88 representing
“unconscious mental processes based on implicit attitudes or implicit stereotypes
which play an often unnoticed role in day to day decision-making.”89 An individual
79

Id. at 701.

80

Budd, supra note 71, at 772.

81

See supra Part II.C.

82

Torres, supra note 35, at 854 (“ . . . it is important to think about the way in which
working-class Chicana/o defendants, law students, and lawyers will be experienced by judges,
juries, professors, and opposing council [sic] who may be of a different class, ethnic, or racial
background.”).
83

Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific
Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 963-64 (2006).
84

Irene V. Blair et al., Unconscious (Implicit) Bias and Health Disparities: Where do We
Go from Here?, 15 PERMANENTE 71, 71 (2011).
85
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1196 (2009).
86

Blair et al., supra note 84, at 71.

87

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.3(b) (2011).

88

Blair et al., supra note 84, at 71.

89
John F. Irwin & Daniel L. Real, Unconscious Influences on Judicial Decision-Making:
The Illusion of Objectivity, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 3 (2010).
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who is careful not to display explicit bias against a particular group may nonetheless
be influenced by “situational cues,” such as a person’s accent or race, which are
feeding unconscious stereotypes.90 This type of bias is “largely automatic; the
characteristic in question (skin color, age, sexual orientation) operates so quickly . . .
that people have no time to deliberate.”91
Even those persons who diligently and consciously combat their own explicit
biases may be influenced to act on the basis of unconscious prejudices.92 This raises
a particular problem for judges, who are directed by the Code to act free of bias and
risk being accused of judicial misconduct if they make decisions in favor of one
group over another. This also raises concerns for litigants in courtrooms, who may
be disadvantaged by a judge’s prejudice without the litigants—or even the judge—
being aware of it. For example, well-meaning judges may not intend to adjudicate
cases in accordance with social stereotypes regarding the poor. However, the
“caricature of the poor” may influence a judge’s decision “whether or not the courts
consciously acknowledge the connection.”93
Thus, it is critical to recognize the role that implicit bias may play in judicial
decision-making. But given the unconscious and automatic nature of implicit bias,
how can its existence be identified or measured? Simply asking survey questions, as
did the Georgia Supreme Court in the study referenced in Part II.C.2., may expose
explicit bias but will not reveal the presence of implicit bias.
i. The Implicit Association Test
Recognizing this problem, a psychologist from the University of Washington
developed the “Implicit Association Test” (IAT) in 1995 to measure unconscious
biases.94 The computerized test “seeks to measure implicit attitudes by measuring
their underlying automatic evaluation.”95
The IAT can take different forms, and has been used in hundreds of studies
spanning many disciplines.96 The most common test “consists of a computer-based
sorting task in which study participants pair words and faces.”97 The test presumes
90

Blair et al., supra note 84, at 71; Mahzarin R. Banaji et al., How (Un)ethical are You?,
81 HARV. BUS. REV. 56, 57 (2003).
91
Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969,
975 (2006); see also Anthony G. Greenwald, Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit
Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1464, 1464
(1998) (“Implicit attitudes are manifest as actions or judgments that are under the control of
automatically activated evaluation, without the performer’s awareness of that causation.”).
92

Banaji et al., supra note 90, at 57 (implicit bias “is distinct from conscious forms of
prejudice, such as overt racism or sexism.”).
93

Budd, supra note 71, at 774.

94

Banaji et al., supra note 90, at 57; Blair et al., supra note 84, at 71. For access to the
IAT, see Project Implicit, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/takeatest.html (last
visited Jan. 23, 2013)
95

Greenwald, supra note 91, at 1464.

96

Blair et al., supra note 84, at 72 (“including psychology, health, political science, and
market research.”).
97

Rachlinski et al., supra note 85, at 1198.
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that participants will respond more quickly to a concept that has a stronger
association for that particular individual.98 Subjects are asked “to rapidly classify
words or images displayed on a computer monitor as ‘good’ or ‘bad.’”99 The speed
with which the participants respond demonstrates the “well-practiced associations”
they hold between a particular object and attribute, which essentially measures their
implicit beliefs.100 In other words, the researchers infer that “the larger the
performance difference, the stronger the implicit association or bias for a particular
person.”101
There is some scholarly dispute about the usefulness of IAT results in predicting
actual behavior.102 For example, some scholars argue that the IAT may not be a
measure of unconscious bias, but rather a “subtle measure of conscious bias that
study participants are unable to conceal.”103
Despite this debate about the IAT’s limitations, legal scholars have used IAT
results over the last decade to examine implicit biases in antidiscrimination law,104
including employment discrimination law,105 and bias in jury selection.106 One
study, conducted in 2009, analyzed IAT results from a large sample of trial judges
nationwide.107
Led by Jeffrey Rachlinski, a professor at Cornell Law, the study sought to
understand why racial disparities persist in the criminal justice system. Judges were
asked to complete the IAT in a form “comparable to the race IAT taken by millions
98

Blair et al., supra note 84, at 72.

99

Irwin & Real, supra note 89, at 3. For example, in tests measuring implicit racial bias,
white respondents tend to respond faster “when ‘black and bad’ items require the same
response and the ‘white’ and ‘good’ items require another response, compared to when ‘black’
and ‘good’ responses are the same and ‘white’ and ‘bad’ responses are the same.” Id. at 72.
100

IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 17 (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds.,
2012).
101

Blair et al., supra note 84, at 72.

102

See, e.g., Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious
Bias Matter?, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053, 1064 (2009) (“In IAT results, ‘levels of implicit bias
consistently diverge from levels of conscious bias, but it is difficult to know whether that
apparent divergence reflects a real underlying difference or is merely an artifact of the
systematic understatement of levels of conscious bias. Conscious bias might well be
underreported.’”); see also Raymond J. McKoski, Reestablishing Actual Impartiality as the
Fundamental Value of Judicial Ethics: Lessons From “Big Judge Davis,” 99 KY. L.J. 259,
321 (2010-2011).
103

Banks & Ford, supra note 102, at 1111.

104

Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 91.

105

Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997 (2006).
106

Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The
Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed
Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149 (2010). For a comprehensive look at implicit racial
bias in various areas of law, see IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW, supra note 100.
107

Rachlinski et al., supra note 85, at 1232.
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of study participants around the world.”108 The study found that implicit biases on
the basis of race were “widespread” among judges.109 In addition, “these biases can
influence their judgment.”110 On a positive note, the study’s authors noticed that
judges were aware of potential biases and, if motivated to do so, could compensate
for implicit bias and avoid its influence.111
It is perhaps no surprise that “judges, like the rest of us, possess implicit
biases.”112 However, the results of the Rachlinski study present significant
implications for judicial ethics guidelines, and the dialogue must be broadened in
scope. If judges are found to harbor implicit biases based on race, it is reasonable to
assume that implicit biases based on other factors, including socioeconomic status,
may also subtly influence judicial decision-making. 113
ii. How Can We Measure Implicit Socioeconomic Bias?
The IAT has not yet been used to analyze implicit judicial bias based on
socioeconomic status. However, two recent studies used the IAT to analyze
socioeconomic bias in other contexts.
The first study, published by the American Medical Association (AMA) in 2011,
analyzed IAT scores in order to “estimate unconscious race and social class bias
among first-year medical students” at the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine in
Baltimore.114 The IAT portion of the study used a race test and a “novel” social class
IAT to identify implicit prejudices based on membership in upper or lower social
classes.115 The study included clinical vignettes based on race and social class, in
order to analyze the “relationship between unconscious bias and clinical assessments
and decision making.”116
The study produced striking results: 86% of the first-year medical students
displayed “IAT scores consistent with implicit preferences toward members of the
upper class.”117 These results were “significantly different” from the student’s stated
preferences, meaning that implicit bias was prevalent in a majority of the medical

108

Id. at 1209.

109

Id. at 1225.

110

Id.

111

Id.

112

Id. at 1232.

113

Banaji et al., supra note 90, at 56 (2003) (at least 75% of IAT test takers show implicit
biases “favoring the young, the rich and whites.”); id. at 58.
114

Adil H. Haider et al., Association of Unconscious Race and Social Class Bias with
Vignette-Based Clinical Assessments by Medical Students, 306 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 942 (2011).
115

Id. at 942. The social class IAT used terms such as “wealthy,” “well-to-do,” “poor,”
and “disadvantaged.” Id. at 943. This social class portion of the IAT has not yet been
completely validated. Id.
116

Id. at 944. The high and low socioeconomic class determinations were completed using
patient occupations. Id.
117

Id. at 949. 69% of the students displayed implicit preferences toward white people. Id.
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students despite their spoken beliefs that they did not hold such prejudices.118 These
findings have important implications for the medical profession, since implicit social
class biases held by physicians may be a contributing factor to disparities in the
health care system.119
The second study, conducted by Irish professors from University College Dublin
and the University of Limerick, was also published in 2011. This study sought to
“establish the presence of prejudice against people from disadvantaged areas” in the
context of social attitudes in Ireland, in order to examine how such prejudice creates
“further social exclusion.”120 The study’s authors created an IAT using pleasant and
unpleasant words with pictures of Limerick city landmarks and disadvantaged
areas.121 Of the 214 Irish participants, 88 were residents of disadvantaged areas,
while 126 were from other, more affluent areas.122
Like the AMA study, the Limerick study revealed significant implicit bias on the
basis of socioeconomic status. In fact, all participants exhibited negative
associations with persons from the disadvantaged parts of Limerick City.123
Participants who themselves resided in disadvantaged areas were no less biased.124
The portion of the study examining explicit bias found similar outcomes. All
participants viewed persons from disadvantaged areas as “less concerned for others
and less responsible” than individuals from non-disadvantaged areas.125 The study’s
authors concluded that residents of poorer communities face prejudice not just on the
part of outsiders, but also from within their own communities.126
Hence both studies examining implicit bias based on socioeconomic class
identified the presence of such bias, one in a group of American medical students
and the other in an economically diverse group of Irish residents. Together, these
results offer evidence to support the theory that implicit socioeconomic bias exists in
varied populations.
There is no reason to believe that judges are exempt from implicit bias against
the poor and disadvantaged. In light of the extraordinary discretionary power
granted to judges in the United States, and the potential impact of judicial
determinations on the lives of individual litigants, this possibility could hold
118
Id. The discrepancy between results showing implicit bias and self-reported explicit
attitudes is a common feature of IAT tests. See IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW,
supra note 100, at 17-18
119

Haider et al., supra note 114, at 949.

120

Niamh McNamara et al., Citizenship Attributes as the Basis for Intergroup
Differentiation: Implicit and Explicit Intergroup Evaluations, 21 J. CMTY. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCH. 243, 246 (2011).
121

Id. at 247.

122

Id.

123

Id. at 251.

124
Id. Other IAT studies have also found individuals from “bias-affected groups” who
“sometimes harbor implicit biases against their own group.” IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS
THE LAW, supra note 100, at 18.
125

McNamara et al., supra note 120, at 251.

126

Id. at 252.
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significant consequences for the fairness of the judicial system. It is also crucial to
identify implicit biases because recognition of such bias may enable judges to
minimize its influence.127
How can we measure whether implicit bias on the basis of socioeconomic status
exists in American courtrooms? In the absence of systematic empirical data, this
Article will examine cases demonstrating the prevalence of implicit bias against the
poor in American courtrooms.
III. IMPLICIT SOCIOECONOMIC BIAS IN FOURTH AMENDMENT AND CHILD CUSTODY
CASES
A. Implicit Socioeconomic Bias in Fourth Amendment Cases
As the federal courts slowly chip away at the constitutional rights of poor
people,128 the implicit biases of federal judges who are removed from the realities of
poor people are becoming increasingly apparent. This section will examine two
recent Fourth Amendment cases through the lens of judicial socioeconomic bias.
These cases reveal the failures of federal judges to appreciate the unique challenges
faced by low-income populations.
The first case, United States v. Pineda-Moreno, is notable for the dissenting
opinion written by Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Alex Kozinski.129 The police came
onto Mr. Pineda-Moreno’s driveway in the middle of the night to attach a GPS
tracking device to his car.130 Using this device, police were able to track Mr. PinedaMoreno’s movements.131 After he was charged with conspiracy to manufacture
marijuana and manufacturing marijuana, Mr. Pineda-Moreno sought to suppress the
evidence obtained from the GPS tracking device.132

127

Rachlinski et al., supra note 85, at 1225.

128

See, e.g., Sanchez v. Cnty of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Budd,
supra note 71, at 751; Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth
Amendment, 55 FLA. L. REV. 391 (2003).
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United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1120 (9th Cir. 2010). Eighteen months
after the opinion discussed in this Article was published, the United States Supreme Court
held in United States v. Jones that attachment of a GPS tracking device to a vehicle, and
subsequent use of the GPS device to monitor the vehicle’s movements on public streets, was a
Fourth Amendment search. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, at Syllabus (2012). In
light of the Jones decision, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment in Pineda-Moreno and
remanded the case to the United States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth
Circuit held on remand that the police’s conduct in attaching the tracking devices in public
areas and monitoring them was authorized by then-binding circuit precedent, and suppression
of the GPS evidence was not warranted. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 688 F.3d 1087,
1091 (9th Cir. 2012). The Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari in the case on
January 22, 2013. Pineda-Moreno v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 994 (2013). The ultimate
disposition of this case does not impact the observations about socioeconomic bias made by
Chief Judge Kozinski in his dissent to the denial of rehearing en banc. Nor does the Ninth
Circuit’s decision on remand affect the analysis described herein.
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Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1121.
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Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1214, vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1533 (2012).
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Pineda-Moreno claimed that the police actions on his property violated his
Fourth Amendment search and seizure rights.133 The court disagreed, reasoning that
the driveway was “only a semi-private area,” and that “‘[i]n order to establish a
reasonable expectation of privacy in [his] driveway, [Pineda-Moreno] must support
that expectation by detailing the special features of the driveway itself (i.e.
enclosures, barriers, lack of visibility from the street) or the nature of activities
performed upon it.’”134
Pineda-Moreno’s petition for rehearing en banc was denied.135 In his dissenting
opinion, Chief Judge Kozinski noted the legal erosion of Fourth Amendment privacy
protections. He specifically discussed the connection between poverty and
diminished Fourth Amendment rights.136 Recognizing that wealthy persons are able
to protect their privacy with “the aid of electric gates, tall fences, security booths,
remote cameras, motions sensors and roving patrols,” Chief Judge Kozinski
explained that those who are not able to afford such protections will be subject to
police searches on their property.137 In contrast, if Mr. Pineda-Moreno had been able
to afford a gate, a garage, or some other method of shielding his car from the street,
his privacy rights would have been protected.138
Chief Judge Kozinski was clearly frustrated by his fellow judges’ failure to
recognize how their ruling would impact poor people. The Ninth Circuit judges
either did not understand or chose to ignore the fact that this decision created a twotiered structure of privacy rights: Wealthy people with gates and garages would be
protected from police incursion onto their properties, while poor people who parked
on the street would be subject to police searches without Fourth Amendment
protection. This is the crux of implicit socioeconomic bias: Judges without exposure
to the lives of low-income people simply don’t appreciate the realities faced by poor
individuals. As a result, these judges make critical legal decisions from a place of
privilege, detrimentally impacting people from lower economic classes.
Similar implicit bias against the poor is apparent in Sanchez v. County of San
Diego, another Fourth Amendment case.139 San Diego County implemented a
program in 1997 requiring all welfare applicants to consent to a warrantless home
visit from an investigator.140 This mandatory visit, which included an interview and
a “walk through” the home by district attorney fraud investigators, was designed to
ensure that applicants were not committing welfare fraud.141 An applicant who
133

Id.
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Id. (quoting Maisano v. Welcher, 940 F.2d 499, 503 (9th Cir. 1991)).
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Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1215.
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Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1123; see also Budd, supra note 71, at 765.
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Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1123.
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Sanchez v. Cnty of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 916 (9th Cir. 2006). When the Ninth
Circuit denied Rocio Sanchez’s petition for rehearing en banc, Judge Harry Pregerson filed a
dissenting opinion noting that, “This case is nothing less than an attack on the poor.” Id. at
969 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 918.
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refused the home visit would be deemed as failing to “cooperate” and would be
denied benefits.142
Welfare applicants filed a class action lawsuit claiming that the home visit
program violated the U.S. and California Constitutions and California welfare
regulations. The U.S. District Court held the program constitutional, relying on the
U.S. Supreme Court’s determination in Wyman v. James that “rehabilitative” visits
to welfare recipients’ homes were constitutional.143
When the case reached the Ninth Circuit, a divided panel affirmed the lower
court’s decision. The majority opinion, written by Judge Tashima, equated San
Diego County’s home visits with the rehabilitative home visits at issue in Wyman.
Since the visits were not related to a criminal investigation, and welfare applicants
could deny consent to the home visits without incurring criminal consequences, the
majority held that the home visits were reasonable.144 Additionally, the majority
held that the County’s welfare system constitutes a “special need” beyond general
law enforcement purposes, finding that, on balance, the government interests at stake
justified the privacy intrusion of a home visit.145 Judge Raymond C. Fisher dissented
from the majority opinion, writing that the San Diego program in Sanchez, which
allowed district attorney investigators with no social work training to enter welfare
applicants’ homes for the purposes of fraud detection, differed from the
rehabilitative visits at issue in Wyman.146
The majority opinion in Sanchez has significant implications for the privacy
rights of poor people, and the case has been thoroughly considered in that context by
other scholars.147 From a judicial ethics perspective, the majority’s opinion exposes
implicit socioeconomic bias and a profound disregard for the realities of poor people.
For example, explaining the court’s justification for the premise that home visits
are not searches under the Fourth Amendment, Judge Tashima wrote that “there is
no penalty for refusing to consent to the home visit, other than denial of benefits.”148
But as the Supreme Court recognized in Goldberg v. Kelly, welfare aid represents
“the very means by which to live” for poor people.149 For many welfare applicants,
receipt of benefits represents the difference between life and death. Yet in effect, the
Sanchez court assumed that welfare applicants do not actually need benefits.150 The
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Id. at 922-23; Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 320 (1971); see also Recent Cases,
Constitutional Law—Fourth Amendment—Ninth Circuit Upholds Conditioning Receipt of
Welfare Benefits on Consent to Suspicionless Home Visits—Sanchez v. County of San Diego,
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court’s treatment of welfare aid as an option which can be easily denied “evinces a
stark refusal to acknowledge the dire situation of welfare recipients.”151
Judge Fisher’s dissent, like Chief Judge Kozinski’s in Pineda-Moreno, pointed
out that the court’s analysis would likely be different if it were the judges’ own
residences subject to intrusion by government investigators. Observing that the San
Diego home visit program essentially permits “snooping” in “medicine cabinets,
laundry baskets, closets and drawers for evidence of welfare fraud,” Judge Fisher
doubted “my colleagues in the majority would disagree that an IRS auditor’s asking
to look in such places within their own homes to verify the number of dependents
living at home would constitute snooping.”152
Judge Fisher’s point highlights the implicit socioeconomic bias in this case.
According to the majority, poor welfare recipients being forced to open their homes
to government examination makes sense, since the government must ensure poor
people are not committing fraud. But requiring wealthy individuals to do the same
thing for purposes of detecting tax fraud would be unjustifiable.
Embedded in this line of reasoning is the unspoken belief that poor people are
often dishonest and deserving of government inspection.153 The Sanchez court,
“while not confessing bias” in an explicit manner, demonstrated bias “without
apology or pretense” and embraced “the stereotype of the immoral poor.”154 This is,
of course, an unmistakable example of implicit socioeconomic bias.
Statements made during oral argument in Sanchez illuminate this point more
clearly.
Judge Kleinfeld, perhaps inadvertently, revealed a fundamental
misconception of the lives of poor people:
I mean, you walk in and you see the $5,000 widescreen TV, and the
person says, “oh, I have all this trouble supporting my children ‘cause I
don’t have a man to help me in the house, and there’s obviously a man to
help her in the house—and that’s seeing if the charity is going where it’s
supposed to go . . . . And you open a closet and you see four suits . . . and
the golf clubs of the person that doesn’t live there, supposedly—same
thing, isn’t it?155
As Professor Jordan Budd explains, when a federal judge adjudicating a welfare
case “suggests that the question plausibly turns on the prospect of welfare recipients
cashing government checks to help cover the cost of greens fees, business attire, and
in-home theatre systems, the reality of judicial bias is apparent.”156 Even Judge
Kleinfeld’s choice of words is revealing: According to Supreme Court precedent,
welfare benefits are not considered to be “charity.”157 Much like the Supreme Court
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judges excoriated by Justice Marshall in Kras for their lack of awareness of the real
challenges facing poor people, the majority in Pineda-Moreno and Sanchez came to
their conclusions from mistaken assumptions about people who live in an economic
class different from their own. These judicial assumptions have consequences; the
implicit beliefs about poverty underlying these court opinions resulted in a
substantial abrogation of the constitutional protections of poor persons.
B. Implicit Socioeconomic Bias and Child Custody Determinations
Federal judges are not the only members of the bench who exhibit implicit
socioeconomic bias. In family court, child custody determinations may also be
affected by implicit judicial bias against poor parents.
The general standard for determining which parents should take custody of a
child is the “best interests of the child” test, which “asks judges to determine custody
‘according to the best interests of the child’ and to ‘consider all relevant factors.’”158
Most states and the District of Columbia provide statutory factors to be considered in
such cases.159 A handful of states draw the relevant factors from common law.160
Some states require judges to consider the capacity of a parent to provide a child
with material needs, including food, clothing, and medical care.161 It is certainly
true that the ability to provide necessary resources should be considered in
determining where to place a child.162 But beyond these basic needs, most states do
not include the wealth of either parent as a factor to consider in child custody cases.
Indeed, a few states, such as California, prohibit judges from considering “the
relative economic positions of two parents” as a “basis upon which to base a
determination of child custody.”163
benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right’—reverted to a
pre-Goldberg vision of welfare.”).
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Despite these statutory and common law guidelines, child custody is an area of
adjudication with a great deal of judicial discretion.164 This discretion may give
“free reign to . . . distorting unconscious biases, resulting in custody awards that are
not necessarily in the best interests of a child.”165 Judicial discretion, coupled with
the fact that most judges are economically privileged and may “exaggerate” the
importance of wealth in a child’s life, creates the potential for implicit
socioeconomic bias in child custody cases.166
For example, the Supreme Court of North Dakota recently reversed a child
custody determination in Duff v. Kearns-Duff, holding that the lower court
impermissibly relied on wealth as a relevant factor.167 North Dakota’s statutory
factors do not include the consideration of economic status,168 and case precedent
explicitly held that “money alone” does not signify a parent’s inclination to provide
for the children.169 Even so, the lower court in Duff, faced with making a “difficult
choice for custody between two apparently fit parents,” resolved the case by relying
on the parties’ recent financial contributions to the marriage.170 Since the mother in
Duff was a radiologist earning $600,000 annually, while the father was enrolled in a
doctoral program at North Dakota State University, the mother had supported the
family “almost exclusively” for the last few years.171 The lower court held that the
mother’s income should be viewed in her favor, and granted custody to her.172
The father appealed to the state Supreme Court, arguing the lower court’s
decision to award custody to the parent earning the most money was erroneous.173
The Supreme Court agreed, rejecting the idea that a parent’s financial contribution to
a marriage is rationally related to the best interests of the children.174 The Supreme
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Court held that the lower court misapplied state law with its reliance on financial
contributions, and remanded the case for reconsideration.175
The lower court’s decision in Duff was clearly influenced by the belief that a
wealthier parent is better able to raise her children. As the Supreme Court pointed
out, this is not a legally correct assumption upon which to build a child custody
determination. But the fact that the lower court defied case precedent to include
wealth as a relevant factor indicates the presence of socioeconomic bias: The father
was penalized solely for the fact that he made less money than his spouse.
This case exemplifies the complex nature of socioeconomic bias. The lower
court arguably displayed explicit socioeconomic bias in his decision, since the
mother’s wealth was openly relied upon as the basis for the custody decision.
However, neither the North Dakota Supreme Court nor any other observer has called
for the lower court judge to be disciplined for socioeconomic bias. Thus, though the
judge’s assumptions about wealth were inaccurate, legally erroneous, and served as
the basis for judicial bias, his assumptions were not questioned by judicial
disciplinary authorities.
Yet, this is also a case of implicit socioeconomic bias; without any proof, the
lower court judge presumed that wealth equaled the best interests of the children.
Nothing in the case record would support this assumption. To reach this conclusion,
the judge must have held an implicit belief that a wealthy parent is a better parent
than a less wealthy parent.
A similar pattern of implicit socioeconomic bias is apparent in West v. West, a
2001 case.176 In West, the Supreme Court of Alaska reversed a decision granting
sole custody to a father on the ground that the father was going to remarry. 177 The
mother relied on her parents to assist with caring for her child. She could not afford
to stay home all day with her son, but instead needed to work for a living.
In a conclusory fashion, the lower court had accepted that living in a two-parent
household, rather than with a less wealthy single working mother, would be in the
best interest of the child. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case,
holding that the lower court’s “assumption that a divorced parent who remarries can
provide a better home than an otherwise equally competent parent who remains
single” is erroneous.178
The Supreme Court chastised the lower court judge for its “unexplained
assumption that the added physical convenience of in-home care that [the child]
might receive from his new second parent” outweighed the “less tangible, but
potentially vital emotional benefits he might receive by maintaining his close and
175
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already-established ties to [his mother] and his maternal grandparents.”179 The
Supreme Court also found fault with the lower court for ignoring the potential stress
that comes from living with a step-parent.180
The lower court judge in West manifested implicit bias based on socioeconomic
grounds. The judge did not overtly cite financial considerations in his decision, and
there was no evidence in the record that the child would receive superior care with
his father and stepmother than with his single working mother.181 Nevertheless
inherent in the lower court’s conclusion that the father’s two-parent household “will
be the better one for [the child]’s future”182 is the implicit belief that a stay-at-home
stepparent who could afford not to work would provide a better home than a working
parent. If this belief were permitted to guide child custody determinations, the
wealthier parent who could stay at home would always be deemed the better parent.
These cases raise troubling implications for family court adjudications. While
some degree of judicial discretion is necessary in family court, judges should not be
permitted to be influenced by stereotypes regarding the connection between
economic wealth and one’s fitness as a parent.
In addition, there are fewer
published appellate opinions from family courts than from federal district courts.183
As a result, litigants may not even be aware that their financial status is being
inappropriately considered by the judge deciding their case. These risks highlight
the need for action to address implicit socioeconomic bias in judicial determinations.
IV. PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS
The problem of implicit socioeconomic bias on the part of judges is increasingly
recognizable, raising significant concerns for judicial ethics observers. Litigants
must be assured of fairness when they enter a courtroom, regardless of their
economic status. Although this elusive problem may not be easily resolved, the
proposals discussed herein represent low-cost ways to address these concerns.
A. Judicial Discipline: An Ineffective Solution
A deceptively simple solution to the problem of implicit socioeconomic bias on
the bench would be judicial discipline: Reprimand or remove those judges who
violate the Code’s prohibition of socioeconomic bias. Unfortunately, judicial
discipline under the Code in its current form would not succeed. Recognizing that
most incidents of judicial socioeconomic bias are based on implicit (and therefore
unconscious) biases, “judges may not be aware of the errors they are making. The
result is still corruption and bias, but this explanation does not rely on some ethical
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failing on the part of the judge.”184 Indeed, no observer has called for disciplining
the Ninth Circuit judges who demonstrated implicit socioeconomic bias in the
Pineda-Moreno or Sanchez cases, or the judges in the child custody cases discussed
above. Thus, disciplining judges for unconscious biases is not a realistic solution.
But if “instead of worrying about crooked judges, we should worry about decent
judges who are susceptible to the same sort of cognitive errors that affect the rest of
us,” how can the justice system (and judicial disciplinary systems) ensure that
judicial decisions are fair and unbiased?185 The natural place to implement more
effective debiasing strategies is within the document designed to guide judicial
behavior: The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct.
B. Clarifying the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct
Several changes in the Code would bring awareness of implicit socioeconomic
bias on the bench. First, the Code must properly define the term “socioeconomic” in
its Terminology section. The definition should be more specific than that offered by
Webster’s New International Dictionary,186 and should include the following
language:
Socioeconomic: of, relating to, or involving a combination of social and
economic factors, including living situation, employment status, financial
net worth, and family circumstances.
This expanded definition would instruct judges about the varied factors within
the term “socioeconomic,” offering clear guidance to judges seeking to avoid
socioeconomic bias on the bench. Moreover, because socioeconomic bias is often
unconscious, expanding this definition would make judges more aware that this type
of bias exists.
Second, the Code should bring much-needed focus to the problem of
socioeconomic bias by removing this form of bias from the enumerated list of
prohibited bias. Rather than being listed as the second-to-last form of prohibited
biases, socioeconomic bias merits a separate sentence. A sentence should be
included at the end of Rule 2.3(b) reading:
A judge shall pay particular attention to avoid bias or prejudice on the
basis of a litigant’s socioeconomic status.
Singling out socioeconomic bias in this way would encourage judges to reflect
on the possibility that their own economic status affects their judicial decisionmaking process. In addition, it would empower litigants by stressing the importance
of the Code’s prohibition of this form of bias. Litigants who believe their cases were
inappropriately influenced by socioeconomic bias would likely feel empowered to
challenge a judicial determination with this stronger Code language to support their
claims.
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Third, the Code must include some reference to the problem of implicit bias.
This issue was raised during the public comment period for the 2007 revisions to the
Code. In a statement submitted to the ABA Joint Commission to Evaluate the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Jennifer Juhler of the Iowa State Court
Administrator’s Office and Judge Mark Cady of the Iowa Supreme Court
recommended the following additions:
(1)Judges should set aside time to examine personal views and to uncover
unconscious bias. Such activities will promote fairness and justice.
(2)A judge should take part in activities designed to uncover subconscious
bias and to learn as much about how to understand the role of such bias in
decision-making. Each judge must be diligent to a process of selfexamination to minimize the impact of personal bias in the administration
of justice.187
These suggested comments were not adopted by the ABA Commission. In light
of studies demonstrating the prevalence of implicit bias, as well as cases revealing
implicit socioeconomic bias on the bench, the Commission’s rejection of these
comments was inappropriate. As the history of the Code of Judicial Conduct
demonstrates, judicial standards should evolve with our new understanding of
implicit bias.
Implicit bias may be difficult to identify, especially in the elusive form of
socioeconomic bias, but the Code should bring awareness to judges that this type of
bias may be pervasive. Inclusion of the comments above would pressure judges to
consider implicit bias in all forms. Since many persons can overcome implicit biases
with enough knowledge and intent to do so,188 the Code’s recognition of this problem
would serve as a catalyst to persuade judges to minimize implicit bias on the bench.
C. Judicial Trainings
Clarifying the Code is not the only way to minimize implicit socioeconomic bias.
Indeed, some would argue that the impact of the Code is limited, since “[j]udicial
ethics, where it counts, is hidden from view, and no rule can possibly ensure ethical
judicial conduct.”189
Although judges may not regularly review the Code of Judicial Conduct, all
judges must attend regular educational trainings. For example, every new judge in
California takes part in two ethics courses within the first year on the bench, one
within the first few weeks of a judicial appointment and the second within the first
year of appointment.190 Federal judges are also thoroughly trained in their first
187
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years on the bench, with week-long orientation programs offered to district judges
and separate trainings for appellate judges.191 The Federal Judicial Center, the
education and research agency of the federal judicial system, conducts continuing
education trainings for federal judges and court employees.192 These trainings
include updates on judicial ethics.193
The National Center for State Courts, recognizing the pervasive nature of
implicit bias on the bench, produced a film and other resources about implicit bias as
part of the National Campaign to Ensure the Racial and Ethnic Fairness of America’s
State Courts.194 This campaign includes: (1) an implicit bias “tool box” with
resource materials to raise awareness; (2) a video discussing “implicit bias in the
justice system; and (3) a curriculum/ follow-up discussion outline that can be
tailored to specific jurisdictions.”195 It is encouraging to note that implicit racial and
gender biases on the part of judges are increasingly recognized by scholars and
judicial training experts. However, these training materials must be expanded to
include implicit socioeconomic bias.
Admittedly, not all forms of judicial training may be useful. Simply learning
about unconscious bias generally may not change judicial behavior.196 It would be
more valuable to provide judges the opportunity to recognize and address their own
implicit biases, since “making someone aware of potential biases, motivating them
to check those biases, and holding them accountable should have some effect on the
translation of bias to behavior.”197
An effective training model would therefore include the presentation of an
Implicit Association Test to judges, specifically designed to test implicit
socioeconomic bias. The IAT test has been characterized as “a powerful and
personalized starting point in educating about implicit bias.”198
Once judges
discover that they may hold implicit biases against the poor, the training should
provide explanatory hypotheticals to demonstrate how this implicit bias can affect
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judicial determinations. The cases discussed in Part III, supra, would provide
glaring examples of this effect. Finally, rather than simply admonishing judges to
avoid the influence of this bias, the judges should be asked to brainstorm about
concrete ways to minimize implicit socioeconomic bias in their own decisionmaking processes. In this way, judges can create their own methods to combat
implicit biases. The ideas generated during these brainstorming sessions could be
shared with other judges in subsequent trainings. Regardless of the specific format,
judges must be made aware of the prevalence of implicit socioeconomic bias on the
bench.
Off-site visits represent another way for judges to combat implicit biases.
Studies show that implicit biases are “malleable” and may be reduced through
exposure to examples that go against stereotypes.199 Federal judges visit federal
prisons as part of their orientation programs, in order to “view firsthand the
conditions that defendants they sentence will confront.”200 Similarly, judges could
visit low-income neighborhoods to learn more about the struggles faced by poor
persons in their jurisdictions. Housing court judges could visit housing projects and
other low-income homes. The Pineda-Moreno majority may have benefited from
visiting the home of Mr. Pineda-Moreno; seeing the street where Mr. Pineda-Moreno
parked may have sparked an understanding of the differences between his life and
theirs.
V. CONCLUSION
When Justice Marshall retired, one of his colleagues on the bench observed that
Justice Marshall “characteristically would tell us things that we knew but would
rather forget; and he told us that we did not know due to the limitations of our own
experience.”201 Some judges need to be reminded that their own experiences are
often limited to the world of the privileged elite. Without those reminders, the
discrepancy between rich judges and poor litigants can result in socioeconomic bias.
Studies showing the pervasive nature of implicit bias highlight the need to devote
more attention to identifying socioeconomic bias in its implicit form. Indeed, a
review of Fourth Amendment and child custody cases reveals that this bias is indeed
present in American courts. It falls squarely within the role of the ABA Model Code
of Judicial Conduct to alert judges to the problem of implicit socioeconomic bias.
However, without specifically defining the term “socioeconomic” or even addressing
implicit bias, the Code in its current form is failing in this task. Revising the Code
and requiring training would help to put the issue of implicit socioeconomic bias on
the judicial agenda.
The widening social and economic gap between America’s rich and poor must
remain outside the doors of our courtrooms. Judges may enjoy the privileges of
economic wealth in their personal lives, but they have an obligation on the bench to
further the fact and appearance of fairness in their decision making.
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